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Abstract
We estimate the contribution of public and private R&D to UK productivity growth on industry data,
1992-2007. R&D aﬀects productivity growth via (1) R&D input, valued at competitive factor shares
and (2) (Domar-Hulten weighted) industry TFP growth if there are (a) within-industry spillovers (b)
between-industry spillovers and (c) spillovers from public-sector R&D to the market sector. Thus eﬀects
depend upon factor shares, spillovers and industrial structure. We estimate all these eﬀects and perform
counter-factual experiments such as e.g. additional government spending on the science budget, increased
manufacturing R&D spending and the eﬀects of such changes with a diﬀerent industrial structure.
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1
1 Introduction
The eﬀect of R&D on UK economic growth remains a key economic and policy question. What for example is
the eﬀect of private and public R&D on productivity? How much of that eﬀect, if any, is due to spillovers, and
what part, if any, can policy play? Does the UK industrial structure, with its relatively small manufacturing
sector (where most R&D is conducted), matter for the impact of R&D? This paper re-examines these question
with some new data and obtains, we think, some new answers.
There are clearly many methods for studying the impact of R&D science on growth, ranging from detailed
historical case studies of particular innovations to cross-country studies using aggregate data. This present
paper uses just one method, which relies on a sources-of-growth plus spillovers framework, implemented on
7 UK industries, 1992-2007. We emphasise that this choice of aggregation, over a limited time period, using
a particular economic framework, is a complement to the other studies in the literature. By its aggregated
nature, for example, it cannot do justice to forensic studies of particular innovations in particular industries
and is therefore only part of the answer to the questions around R&D. Nonetheless, we think it of some
interest since it is capable of answering a number of interesting questions for economists and policy-makers
that other datasets might be less suited to: for example, counter-factual questions on the eﬀects of industrial
structure.
The canonical description of the sources-of-growth approach to understanding how R&D aﬀects economic
growth is set out in, for example, Griliches (1973).1Using industry data we may write total (market sector)
value added growth as growth in inputs, weighted by their competitive factor shares in market sector value
added, plus growth in industry TFP, weighted by their Domar-Hulten weights (Domar (1961), Hulten (1978)).
Thus R&D-induced productivity growth is due to (a) changes in the market-sector R&D knowledge stock
times its competitive factor rental share of market sector output and (b) spillovers working through TFP
growth. Spillovers consist of (i) any spillovers from industry 1's private R&D within industry 1 (ii) any
spillovers from industry 1's private R&D to any other industry and (iii) any spillovers from public R&D
to all industries. The direct eﬀect (a) we recover simply from measurement of private sector R&D and its
rental cost. The spillover eﬀects we obtain from estimating three coeﬃcients capturing spillovers of R&D
(i) within and (ii) between industries and (iii) spillovers from the public sector. Estimation of these eﬀects,
and Domar-Hulten weighting, allows us to answer some questions such as (a) what are the eﬀects of raising
public R&D support on growth (b) how do they compare with other policies, such as tax credits that might
raise private R&D and (c) how do these eﬀects interact with the structure of the economy (of interest in the
UK since the manufacturing base is relatively small)?
Existing datasets cannot, to the best of our knowledge, answer these questions. Incorporating private
R&D into industry data requires changing both inputs but also outputs (since both gross output and value
added have to be recalculated if R&D is counted as an investment not an intermediate: Griliches (1973);
Schankerman (1981) set out some of the biases involved if one does not do this). Current UK National
Accounts data is not available an industry level with R&D so capitalised. The leading industry productivity
database, www.euklems.net, O'Mahony and Timmer (2009), does not incorporate R&D either. We therefore
construct industry data, based on EU-KLEMS (O'Mahony and Timmer (2009), but that capitalises private
R&D and maintains consistent bottom-up Domar-Hulten aggregation. Thus we believe that one contribution
1 In this work, the R&D growth impact is ratio of R&D spend to GDP times the rate of return to R&D, with the spend public
and private and the rate of return reﬂecting private and social returns. To get some idea of the UK numbers, in the UK,
the R&D/GDP ratio is about 2%. If the rate of return is, say, 30% (Griliches (1992), then the contribution is 0.6%pa (set
against typical growth rates of, say 3%pa). Note that the private rate of return to R&D is typically suggested to be about
20%, so the ﬁgure of 30% reﬂects (a) spillovers from private R&D and (b) an assumed rate of return of 30% to public R&D.
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of this paper is bring new data to bear on these questions.
We estimate spillovers from private R&D in other industries using the industry-level method of for
example, Griliches (1973); Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984). This weights the private knowledge stock in
outside industries by weights based on ﬂows of intermediate consumption or labour between industries.
We estimate spillovers from public R&D by looking for eﬀects on private industry TFP growth, and also
experimenting with weights (based on industry private sector R&D and industry private sector co-operation
with the public sector).
Our method depends upon the data and assumptions in constructing TFP and our other measures. We
therefore check to see if our results are robust. We argue they are robust to, for example, diﬀerent measures
of industry R&D, depreciation, asset capitalisation and spillover mechanism, diﬀerent lag structures and
allowing for imperfect competition and non-constant returns to scale.
How does our study relate to others for the UK? Regarding time series, Guellec and de la Potterie (2004)
use cross-country (including the UK) and Haskel and Wallis (2013) market sector UK data on total factor
productivity and publicly and privately funded R&D. At the industry level, Añón Higón (2007) uses a panel
of eight UK manufacturing industries, but does not study public R&D.2 She surveys three UK industry
panel surveys that use TFP, all of which use data for the 1970s and 1980s and do not capitalise TFP. Bonte
(2004) studies TFP and public and private R&D for using German manufacturing industries.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. First, we ﬁnd evidence of spillovers of private R&D and public R&D, with
an estimated rate of return to public R&D of 20%. Second, our data are consistent with the idea that the
public R&D spillover to an industry depends, however, on the absorptive capacity of the industry (its R&D
spend or involvement with the public sector). Third, our counter-factual policy experiments suggest a 10%
rise in public R&D would raise private TFP growth by 0.03pppa (relative to a baseline of TFP growth at
1.46%pa). This would be 0.04pppa if the UK had Germany's industrial structure.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section sets out the conceptual framework and measurement,
section 3 the data, section 4 the results, section 5 some policy implications, and robustness checks and section
5 concludes.
2 Framework and existing literature
We set out our framework and then discuss how we think we add to the existing literature.
2.1 Model
Suppose an industry i has a gross output production function, which might be translog for example, of the
form
Git = AitF (Lit,Kit,Mit, Rit, R_it) (1)
where G, L, M , K are gross output, and, respectively, labour, materials and tangible capital services. R are
the intangible capital services in industry and R_i is ﬂow of intangible services from outside the industry,
some of which might yield a ﬂow of productive services to the industry via spillovers. It might include
2 Regarding the eﬀects of public sector R&D, Salter and Martin (2001) in their survey quote nine studies, all for the US, all
of which are on agriculture (including Griliches, 1958 on hybrid corn). They also survey non-econometric studies, notably
Mansﬁeld (1991). More recent UK analyses for the health sector have estimated rates of return to public sector R&D of over
30% of which however around 20% is assumed on the basis of the earlier US studies. For this and a review of public sector
R&D impacts more generally see Hughes and Martin (2012).
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publicly ﬁnanced R&D; knowledge produced elsewhere in the world etc. Ait is any increase in output not
accounted for by the increase in the other inputs. Stocks of capital are assumed generated by a perpetual
inventory model so that for R we have
Rt = N − δRRt−1 (2)
where Nt is spending on new ideas, and δis their depreciation/obsolescence.
Deﬁne industry-level gross output TFP growth as:
∆ lnTFPGit ≡ ∆ lnGit −
∑
X=Lit,Mit,Kit,Rit
s¯X,it∆ lnXit (3)
where the Tornquist share of each factor X is
s¯X,it ≡ 1
2
(
pXitXit
pGitG
+
pXit−1Xit−1
pGit−1Git−1
)
, X = Lit,Mit,Kit, Rit (4)
i.e. the bar above sX,it denotes a time average so that this expression holds if, for example, the underlying
production function is translog (Caves et al. (1982). Using a ﬂexible functional form such as this is important
since we shall use a panel of industries and it can accommodate diﬀerent output elasticities in e.g. utilities
compared with business services. If equation 1 is separable in all elements beside M then we can write
the relation between industry gross output and aggregate value added growth as follows ((Jorgenson et al.
(2007)). Deﬁne aggregate value added Q as
Qt = AtF(Lt,Kt, Rt) (5)
Then we can write
∆ ln (Q/H)t ≡ sQ,Lt ∆ ln (L/H)t + sQ,Kt ∆ ln (K/H)t + sQ,Rt ∆ ln (RPRIV /H)t +
∑
DHit(∆ lnTFP
G
it ) (6)
where the ﬁnal term is a Domar-Hulten weighted average of industry gross output ∆ lnTFPGit (DH weights
captures the eﬀect that a TFP improvement in one sector can boost growth in other sectors depending on
the extent to which that output is, in turn, an input into other sectors, see Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978).
Expression 6 holds as an accounting identity in our data3.
We now set out a behavioural assumption for 4lnTFPGit which is
∆ lnTFPGit = 4lnAit + γ1∆ lnRPRIVit + γi,_i∆ lnRPRIV_it + γi,PUB∆ lnRPUB (7)
which says that 4lnTFPGit depends on own R, outside R that is private, lnRPRIV_it and outside R that is
public, lnRPUB_it (since we use market sector industry data, we assume that R&D in industries is private and
so denote is RPRIV ).
Measuring ∆ lnR_it is typically done by assuming a matrix that weights the various ∆ lnR_it in some
way e.g. by technological distance, input/output relations etc. If we assume this amounts to a weighted
sum over industries with weight ωi,_i,
4 so that γi,_i∆ lnR
PRIV
_it = γ2(Σωi,_it∆ lnR
PRIV
_it ) we are now in a
3 By which we mean, that 4lnTFPY is constructed so that 6 holds, which in turn is done such that real industry gross output
growth is a superlative index number weighted average of value added and intermediate growth: this is a standard procedure
in, for example, EUKLEMS, to ensure adding up between industries and overall value added.
4 That is, industry i has a vector of weights on other industries _i.
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position to see how much R&D impacts on overall growth
∆ ln (Q/H)t = s
Q,L
t ∆ ln (L/H)t + s
Q,K
t ∆ ln (K/H)t + s
Q,R
t ∆ ln
(
RPRIV /H
)
t
+
∑
DHit
(
4lnAit + γ1∆ lnRPRIVit + γ2(Σωi,_it∆ lnRPRIV_it ) + γi,PUB∆ lnRPUB
)
(8)
This is the expression that we shall calculate and hence it is worth explaining. The eﬀect of R&D on
overall growth arises from four channels. First,sQ,Rt ∆ ln(R
PRIV /H) is the eﬀect of R&D capital (per hour)
multiplied by the rental cost share of R&D . This is the contribution of private R&D evaluated at the
private sector's private rate of return i.e. the output elasticity consistent with a private rate of return under
competition and constant returns. Note that we shall relax these assumptions in our robustness checks and
ﬁnd our results robust. Second, we have three spillover eﬀects in the second line of (8). Theγi,i∆ lnR
PRIV
it
term reﬂects spillovers within the industry; the γi,_i(Σω_it∆ lnR
PRIV
_it ) term is spillovers from outside the
industry and ﬁnally the γi,PUB∆ lnR
PUB are spillovers from public R&D, which might be public sector
or another source of ideas e.g. the internet, foreign R&D etc. Note that all the spillover terms, which
aﬀect (gross output based) 4lnTFPY , are weighted by the Domar-Hulten weight. To obtain the γs we
shall estimate 7 econometrically. For the avoidance of doubt, when it comes to measurement we will not
be able to distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary spillovers (Griliches (1992)) but use the term
spillovers for convenience.
2.2 Existing literature
To work out the eﬀect of R&D on ∆lnQ/H we shall calculate the terms in (8) which will need us to estimate
the γs in (7) econometrically. How does this relate to the existing literature? As mentioned above the
spillovers from private R&D to other industries is estimated using the industry-level method of for example,
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) where ω is based on ﬂows of intermediate consumption or labour between
industries. Spillovers from public R&D also use weights based on industry private R&D and co-operation
with the public sector. Based on the survey by Añón Higón (2007)5 we note that (a) to the best of our
knowledge, no UK studies have looked at the eﬀect of public R&D, (b) very few studies capitalise R&D
into TFP (c) none include spending on non-R&D intangibles (such as software, training etc.) to knowledge
investment (our results are robust to dropping this). Note ﬁnally we base our work on industry gross
output, which is less restrictive than other studies and use DH weights to obtain aggregated eﬀects. Thus
this approach contrasts with that taken in some papers which is to ignore the industry dimension, use an
aggregate value added term , V , without R&D capitalised and so write down
∆ ln (V/H)t = s
V,L
t ∆ lnL/Ht + s
V,K
t ∆ lnK/Ht + ε
R
t ∆ lnR+ a (9)
If R does not depreciate this may be simpliﬁed to
∆ ln (V/H)t = s
V,L
t ∆ lnL/Ht + s
V,K
t ∆ lnK/Ht + ρ
R
t
(
N
V
)
+ a (10)
5 See her Table 1. She surveys six UK studies based on TFP, one cross-sectional, two time series and three panel. Of these
studies, one uses the input/output tables to generate outside R&D knowledge ﬂows, Sterlacchini (1989) who uses a cross-
section of 15 industries, 1945-83 (and ﬁnds spillovers). Higon studies eight manufacturing industries, 1970-97 and also ﬁnds
spillovers, using the I/O tables to generate outside knowledge ﬂows.
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Table 1: R&D performed in the UK in each sector according to source of funding, 2011
Sector performing the work
Government Research Councils Higher Education Business Enterprise Private Non-Proﬁt Total
Sector providing the funds
Government 977 86 406 1,601 68 3,138
Research Councils 47 819 1,979 11 86 2,942
Higher Education Funding Council - - 2,257 - - 2,257
Higher Education 2 11 290 - 14 317
Business Enterprise 203 26 284 11,957 85 12,556
Private Non-Proﬁt 3 47 987 104 165 1,306
Abroad 77 51 923 3,734 79 4,864
TOTAL 1,308 1,040 7,127 17,408 496 27,380
Source: ONS, GERD release, Table 1.
Notes to table: Columns 1+2= GovERD, column 3=HERD, column 4=BERD, column 5=PNP, sum of
columns is GERD. - denotes not available
where ρR is a social rate of return on R&D spend since R&D is not capitalised. An aggregate approach is
adopted in, for example, Guellec and de la Potterie (2004) (cross-countries) and Haskel and Wallis (2013) for
the UK6. Our use of (8) brings in cross-industry variation and enables us to examine the eﬀect of industry
structure on growth by looking at DH weights. Bonte (2004) uses gross output German industry data with
R&D capitalised, just as we do, and input/output and technology measures for ω.
3 Data
3.1 Public R&D
If we are to measure 4lnRPUB we need to be clear what we mean by "public" R&D. There are a number of
issues here, most of which are anticipated in Griliches (1979) prescient discussion. The bulk of the questions
arise around the possible public goods aspect of knowledge. To see this, table 1 sets out 2011 UK R&D
data taken from the oﬃcial national accounts data (GERD) on R&D by the sector providing the funds, in
the rows and performing the work, in the columns.7 On the far right bottom corner shows the total spend,
¿27.380bn in 2011 current prices. The column headed "business enterprise" shows that in total ¿17.408bn of
that spending/performing was performed by business. The other columns show ¿1.3bn, ¿1.04bn, ¿7.127bn
and ¿0.496bn was performed by government departments, research councils, higher education and charities.
Turning to the rows, the business enterprise row and column cell show that ¿11.957bn was both funded and
performed in the business sector.
What then is public R&D: funded or performed? First, the most self-contained is the Higher Education
Funding Council which provides ¿2.257bn of funding of R&D which is wholly performed and funded in one
locus, higher education. Second, research councils fund ¿2.942bn of which a very small fraction, ¿11m, is
performed in the business sector. The majority is performed in Higher Education, ¿1.979bn, or in public
6 Using cross-country data, Guellec and de la Potterie (2004) ﬁnd elasticities of total factor productivity to publicly (privately)
funded research of 0.17 (0.13): Haskel and Wallis (2013) ﬁnd a similar public elasticity, but smaller private elasticity using
UK time series data.
7 The Appendix provides further information on some of the items in this table.
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research institutes, (¿47m+¿819m=)¿866m.8 Third, "government departments" (so not including research
councils) spent ¿3.138bn of which just over 50%, ¿1.601bn, is performed in the business sector9, and just
over 33%, (¿977m+¿86m=)¿1.063bn, is performed by government departments, that is by public research
institutes and government owned laboratories.10
All this shows that government funding of R&D is not the same as government performance of R&D.
What is the most appropriate to use? From a productivity point of view, we wish to relate input to output,
so we are interested in the knowledge investment that builds knowledge capital in the industry for which
we have corresponding output data. If we use R&D performed in industry J, we assume that such R&D
builds knowledge capital in industry J. This would be appropriate if the industry builds it knowledge capital
stock by performing R&D. One might however argue that if performed R&D in industry J is funded by
industry K, we should allocate investment not to J, but to the funding industry K. Note for example, in the
"government" spending line, ¿1.6bn of government spending is performed in the business sector. This would
assume that knowledge capital resides in the funding industry, if for example, funding confers ownership,
and no knowledge resides in the industry where it is performed.
One might assume that funding conferred ownership. To shed light on this assumption, ONS has recently
extended its R&D questionnaire to ask ﬁrms about both the funding and also the ownership of R&D, see
Steer and for na Ker (2013). They ﬁnd for example, that even though 64% of the R&D conducted by the
UK Business sector is funded by the business sector, 72% of it is owned by the business sector. As for
government, it funds 8.3% of business sector R&D but owns 6.3% of it. This suggests that using funding as
a rule for allocating ownership will understate business investment and overstate government ownership.
In our econometric work we shall test robustness to a number of diﬀerent allocations, but to construct
a baseline case we stick essentially to allocation by performer. First, we use the data from GERD since
we wish to relate our work as closely as possible to national accounts (where, at time of writing, R&D is
not yet available capitalised by industry into national accounts and no UK satellite accounts are published).
Second, to construct private R&D, we use ¿17.406bn, that is, according to the sector that performs the R&D.
As the table shows, this implicitly includes some Government funded R&D that is performed by business
(¿1.601bn=6%), but a large fraction of that will actually be owned by business. For government R&D,
we started with performance by government, research councils and higher education (that is, the sums of
columns 1, 2 and 3). From that, we subtracted oﬀ that funded by business (i.e. row 5) (our results turn out
to be robust to this).
In summary, private R&D is that performed in the business sector. Government R&D is that performed
by government, research councils and higher education, less that amount performed in these sectors but
funded by business.11 We describe how we allocate private R&D to industry below.
We can get some sense of the time series behaviour of these data in Figure1 below. ∆lnTFP was low in
the 1990s, but accelerated in the early 2000s, before slowing again. ∆lnKR&Dwas high in the early 1990s (in
8 Here ¿47m is allocated to performance by government departments and ¿819m to performance by research councils. Figure
7 in the GERD release (ﬂow of funds) shows that this ¿866m is performed by public research institutes.
9 Of the ¿1.601bn funded by government but performed by business, the GERD (2013) release states that such government
awarded contracts include those to UK business to develop aircraft, naval ships, submarines and their systems and equipment.
Similarly, for the US, Hall (1996) notes, table 6-2, that of the $33bn spent by government in 1991 performed in industry,
$26bn was defence, $4.2bn NASA and $2.6bn Energy.
10The largest ministries spending this ¿977m are Ministry of Defence, BIS (spending on space and agricultural safety at the
Purbright Institute), the National Health Service (NIHR) and DEFRA (various agricultural and animal health research).
11Strictly, we should then allocate the R&D performed by the public, but funded by business back to the business sector funding
it, but we do not have these data. We omit private non-proﬁt from this current study since we have no consistent back data.
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Figure 1: Time series of UK market sector ∆lnTFP , ∆lnRPRIV and NPUB/G
.
01
8
.
02
.
02
2
.
02
4
.
02
6
N
(P
UB
)/G
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
D
ln
TF
P,
 D
ln
R
(P
RI
V)
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
DlnTFP DlnR(PRIV)
N(PUB)/G
Note: weighted sums use Domar-Hulten weights, R&D shares, gross output shares
fact it was higher in the 1980s), dipped and then speeded up and then slowed again in the early 2000s. Public
R&D spend, as a proportion of gross output fell in the mid 1990s, but was then expanded very substantially
over most of the period with the exception of 2002-4.
3.2 Public R&D
Before proceeding to other measurement issues, we are now in a position to review the diﬀerent concepts of
public and private used in the extant literature. Hall (1996) is particularly clear on this point, stressing that
of total US Federal government spending on R&D in 1991, around 50% is performed in private industries
(of which 3/4 is in defence), 25% in universities and 25% within government facilities (mostly defence and
space). As she points out, there are (at least) two research questions: what is the rate of return to (a)
publicly ﬁnanced R&D performed in industries and (b) publicly ﬁnanced R&D performed in universities
and government facilities? On question (a) she reports the industry studies of Griliches and Lichtenberg
(1984) and Bartelsman (1990) who ﬁnd little impact on TFP growth of R&D performed in an industry that
is federally funded (for a similar discussion and more studies, see Hall et al. (2009), section 3.3.2: Levy and
Terleckyj (1983) ﬁnd more positive results for government-funded R&D). This could be due to a range of
factors such as beneﬁts being too diﬀuse to capture in one industry, to measurement problems (especially
acute in an industry like defence where government is a purchaser). These issues are discussed below. On
question (b), Hall reports few studies and that such spending is likely much too diﬀuse to measure.
3.3 Other data
3.3.1 Industries
As in (7), we also estimate spillovers from the conduct of private R&D inside and outside the industry.
Estimates for growth in the stock of private industry R&D and TFP come from our industry-level dataset in
which estimates of intangible investment are capitalised in a way fully consistent with the national accounting
framework; for a full discussion of data derivation and detailed sources see Borgo et al. (2013). This work
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Table 2: Industries used in our market sector deﬁnition
SIC(2003) Number Industry Description
ABC 1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining
D 2 Manufacturing
E 3 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply
F 4 Construction
GHI 5 Distribution; Hotels & Restaurants; Transport, Storage & Communications
J 6 Financial Services
K 7 Business Activities (excluding real estate)
Note: Regressions and ﬁgures omit industry ABC due to land being unmeasured.
uses the seven broad industries as set out in Table 2. We use the seven broad industries due to limited
industry detail in the intangible data. We have data from 1992 to 2007.
We start in 1992 due to the IO tables not being available earlier. We end in 2007 since we rely on
EUKLEMS data, and more up to date real industry intermediates and gross output are not available from
the ONS. The quality of most of our industry-level intangible investment data improves greatly from 1992, the
ﬁrst year of published IO analysis. Data are extended further back but there is inevitably some imputation
for earlier years. We estimate initial capital stock in 1990 using the standard method (e.g as in Oulton and
Srinivasan (2003)). So that estimates are not too aﬀected by initial values problems, we conduct our analysis
over the period 1995 to 2007. We exclude real estate from SIC K which therefore excludes imputed rents
due to owner-occupied housing which is not counted as capital in our data. In our analysis we also exclude
Agriculture. In Agriculture land is a major factor of production, but is not treated as a capital asset in the
National Accounts framework by (European) national accounting convention. This makes TFP diﬃcult to
interpret and in fact we ﬁnd it to be measured as negative for agriculture over much of our data period.
3.3.2 Data on output and tangible investment
Our output and tangible data come from EUKLEMS (O'Mahony and Timmer (2009))which is based on UK
National Accounts and uses a consistent set of real and nominal output variables which sum to the aggregate.
In computing TFP we adjust both the input and also the output data. All the input shares sum to one
and the rental prices are calculated consistently using the ex post method so that the sum of capital rental
payments, including intangibles, equals total capital payments. Because we are working at the industry level,
TFP is calculated on a gross output basis, which does not impose restrictions on the form of the production
function that value added would. We make sure that the bottom-up data aggregates to the market-sector.
3.3.3 Data on intangible investment including private R&D
In estimating TFP we also account for the contributions of the full range of intangible assets set out in
Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005). Since our focus here is on spillovers from R&D, we just focus on that
asset below. For a full discussion of all of our other data on intangibles, see Goodridge et al. (2012).
Industry-level business R&D data are derived from the Business Enterprise R&D survey (BERD). The
largest 400 R&D performers are sent a "long" form, where they set out their spend on R&D in the form of
wages, materials and investment and are asked to allocate such spend to "product groups" e.g. pharmaceu-
ticals, chemicals etc. Other performers are sent a "short form" and are asked for spend on all their R&D
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activities regardless of product group.
To allocate such spending to industries we take a number of steps. First, one component reported BERD
expenditure data is investment in tangible assets used in R&D production. We convert this into a rental cost
of tangible capital. Second, we then assign detailed product groups to industries, assuming, for example, that
R&D performed on pharmaceutical products is performed in the pharmaceuticals industry. Third, to avoid
double counting of R&D and software investment, R&D spending in "computer and related activities" (SIC
72) is subtracted from R&D spending, since this is already included in the software investment data (around
¿1.7bn 2011). Fourth, all ﬁrms who get a short form, and ﬁrms who get a long form, but where the product
groups are either missing or they are unable to assign their spending to them, have their spending allocated
by ONS to the product group "Research & Development Services", which includes the R&D conducted
by the R&D services industry (SIC 72) that is sold to outside industries. In the raw data this is around
¿600m, but is likely a mismeasure since it is a residual allocation. Thus we allocate this spending to the
industries that purchase R&D services from SIC73, using shares constructed from the IO tables. So this
re-allocation is done on a funder basis which would seem to be inconsistent with the performer principle
used above. However, we would argue that the initial allocation to that industry does not truly reﬂect the
industry of the performer, but rather statistical uncertainty. Thus, by performing this re-allocation we shall
not ﬁnd apparent spillovers due solely to the classiﬁcation of this section of R&D into R&D services. Both
these last two steps increase the skewness of the R&D cross-industry distribution since they allocate R&D
towards manufacturing. We test to see if our our results are robust to these assumption and ﬁnd they are
(see below).12
3.3.4 "Outside" R&D
The above gives us data on growth in R&D capital internal to the industry. For our measures of growth in
R&D capital external to the industry, we weight the industry measures using (a) labour transitions between
industries and (b) intermediate consumption ﬂows between industries: this follows for example Griliches and
Lichtenberg (1984). Labour transitions come from panel labour force survey data indicating the fraction of
workers employed in industry K who were previously in industry J. Intermediate inputs use data from the
Input-Output tables for 1992-2007. We then apply these weights to our industry estimates of knowledge
stocks. For each industry we construct a term for growth in available outside knowledge as the industry
weight multiplied by growth in the relevant capital stock from the other six industries. Therefore, say for
example, 50% of IC in industry X comes from within the industry, the weights for other industries will sum
to 0.5. For more details, see Haskel et al. (2012)
12An alternative allocation system is to allocate spending into the "industry" that the enterprise returning the form is recorded
in. This raises a number of issues. First, ONS follows the rule in the IO tables and in the R&D by industry tables they publish
that any R&D performed in a physically distinct addresses i.e. a separate reporting unit is allocated to the SIC "Scientiﬁc
R&D" industry (so e.g. here R&D done by a pharmaceutical company in a distinct address that reports a pharmaceutical
product code is allocated to pharmaceutical industry, whereas on the IO tables to Scientiﬁc R&D). Note too that in the
oﬃcial BERD data spending by product group "R&D services" is much smaller than spending by SIC Scientiﬁc R&D,
because ONS allocate as much spend as they can to the relevant product group (compare for example Table 2 and Table
27 in the 2012 BERD release, (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rdit1/bus-ent-res-and-dev/2012/stb-berd-2012.html).
A second conceptual point, discussed in, for example, Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) is whether it is more appropriate to
allocate by product group or industry. As they point out, some large ﬁrms might undertake R&D across a number of diﬀerent
industries e.g. an automotive ﬁrm working on bulldozers and headlamps is by "origin" in the auto industry, but the "use" of
the R&D is in construction equipment and electrical machinery industries. They prefer the "use" concept, and so use, as we
do, the product class to allocate R&D spending across industries.
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3.3.5 Co-operation
As we set out below, we try to measure the absorptive capacity of industries. One indicator will be R&D
spend. Another is the extent of co-operation between industries and the public sector. We obtain this from
four waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey (UKIS) (UKIS3 covering 1998-2000, UKIS4, covering
2002-2004, UKIS 5 covering 2005-2007 and UKIS6, covering 2006-2008). We aggregate company responses to
form an industry fraction of the ﬁrms reporting they have formal co-operation agreements with universities
or government research centres; henceforth termed COOP . Firms are also asked separately if they ﬁnd these
institutions useful sources of information, but there is in fact very high correlation across these two measures,
so we just use co-operation. For more details, see Haskel et al. (2014).
4 Econometric method and results
4.1 The transition to econometric work
We aim to estimate (7) which with the outside term substituted in is
∆ lnTFPGit = 4lnAit + γ1∆ lnRPRIVit + γ2(Σωi,_it∆ lnRPRIV_it ) + γi,PUB∆ lnRPUB (11)
To estimate it we take the following steps. First, to construct ∆ lnTFPGit we capitalise all intangible in-
vestments and construct using all inputs. This ensures that the coeﬃcients on the right-hand side are
excess returns. Second, turning to the right hand side, we enter industry and time eﬀects to control for
4lnAit.13 Third, to measure 4lnRPRIVit we enter the own-industry R&D capital stock used in measuring
∆ lnTFPit: this is private R&D since the industries are all in the market sector which is overwhelmingly
private. Fourth, as above to measure (Σωit∆ lnR_it) we weight outside industry 4lnRPRIVit with labour
transition or intermediate input weights.
Fifth, regarding ∆ lnRt
PUB we proceed as follows. As is conventional, we assume that public R&D does
not depreciate: to the extent it is basic then is likely to at least become less obsolete than RPRIV : the ONS
report using a depreciation rate of 5% for government R&D (Whittard et al. (2008)). Using the standard
transformation, since from the PIM, ∆lnRPUBt = N
PUB/RPUBt−1 when δ
PUB = 0, the ﬁnal term in (11) can
be written (∂G/∂RPUB)(RPUB/G)it = (ρit)(R
PUB/G)it where ρit = (∂G/∂R
PUB)it which is the rate of
return of public R&D. Thus we can write (11) as
∆ lnTFPGit = ai + at + γ1∆ lnR
PRIV
it + γ2(Σωi,_it∆ lnR
PRIV
_it ) + ρit
(
NPUBt
Git
)
(12)
A number of factors militate against estimating a precise eﬀect of NPUB/Git (see for example the
discussion of measuring the impact of NASA on productivity in Griliches (1979) and the papers referenced
therein such as Terleckyj (1975). First, as discussed above, since we are using a performer concept, publicly
ﬁnanced R&D that is performed in business is subsumed in 4lnRPRIV . Thus the coeﬃcient on that variable
13Fixed and time eﬀects control for industry and common shocks. However, one might argue there are time-varying shocks to
individual industries that we cannot pick up with these dummies. Given the internationalisation of R&D, one such shock
might be e.g. knowledge ﬂows from R&D in Chinese manufacturing and so our results are biased if ∆lnR in industry i is
correlated with a knowledge ﬂow in that industry from elsewhere in the world. If the endogenous choice of ∆lnR is positively
correlated with such shocks then our spillover results are upward-biased, but if such shocks mean ﬁrms allocate R&D abroad
then the results are downward biased.
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strictly is an elasticity encompassing some public R&D. At time of writing we do not have the data to extract
such R&D from the industry data.14
Second, consider questions around timing and possible heterogeneity of ρit, that is, the marginal impact
of NPUB/Git across industries. Recall that N
PUB is public R&D performed in public labs and research
institutes, by research councils and by universities. This creates a number of issues, essentially because any
returns are likely be diﬀuse and might take time as follows.
First, by its very nature, public knowledge might have an industry-speciﬁc marginal impact. For exam-
ple, most research council sector spend is primarily technical and scientiﬁc, some is agricultural and little is
directed at the arts (hence ρ might vary across i; Griliches (1979)section 2.6 discusses this, although agricul-
ture might be an exception where public spending might be readily identiﬁable with a particular industry).
Absorptive capacity might also be another source of heterogeneity, see Cohen and Levinthal (1989) who
suggest this propensity might vary by ﬁrm R&D but set out a careful description of other factors (such
as technology etc.). At the industry level, distinguishing between absorptive capacity and the industry ap-
propriate knowledge is impossible, but all this suggests we should model the heterogeneity ρit. Thus as a
summary measure we write
ρi,t = ρ0 + ρ1
Xit∑
Xit
(13)
where Xit is entered as a fraction of its sum so that we can read oﬀ the rate of return directly. To see this,
note that for a particular industry, k, in year t the rate of return is ρK = ρ0 + ρ1XK/ΣX: thus the average
rate of return over all industries is ΣρK = Σ(ρ0+ρ1XK/ΣX) =Σρ0+ρ1. The Σρ0term appears because with
the form of (13) a constant rate of return per industry will add up over all industries to an economy-wide
return. As it turned out, ρ0 was never statistically signiﬁcant in our models and so drop it here. That said,
(13)is presentationally convenient, but imposes a particular functional form for ρi.
We experiment with two measures of absorptive capacity, Xi, private R&D and second COOP. The co-
operation variable has the beneﬁt of being less skewed than R&D spend, which is mostly in manufacturing.
Second, the eﬀects of Nt might take time and so we would want to experiment with lags. Some might
be very long: the diﬀusion of laser technology into retailing for example took 30 years which we would be
unable to identify on our data. That said, Adams et al. (2006) ﬁnd citations of university scientiﬁc papers by
papers from industrial R&D concerns to have a mean lag of three years, and scientiﬁc advance in universities
can be implemented into incremental innovation quite quickly. As documented in Hughes and Kitson (2012,
2013), university-industry interactions proceed along multiple pathways of which people-based recruitment,
consultancy and collaborative relationships may enter in business practice eﬀects relatively quickly and which
may span multiple business functions beyond technological innovation per se. In practice we experiment with
lags of up to six years: if they are truly longer, than our estimates are a lower bound on the true eﬀect
(Bonte (2004)also uses three year lags).
Third, as Griliches (1979) points out, the extent to which public knowledge gives measured returns
depends upon the extent to which it produces quality or quantity improvements, and to which these are
measured. So, for example, a publicly-funded quality improvement made freely available to all would cause
14Such spending is mostly in defence and health where outputs (security, longevity etc. are poorly measured) and purchasers
of such services likely do not pay a market price for them. We also note that the defence and health public industries are
excluded from our data (although pharmaceuticals and aerospace are of course in manufacturing). In our data, the proportion
of business performed R&D that is funded by the government has remained remarkably constant over the data period, 8.9%
(1995-2005), varying from 10.4% to 8.0%. As Griliches (1991) notes, industry level returns to state-funded R&D might be
diﬀerent than private returns if such funding is exactly in areas where private returns are low due e.g. to appropriability
problems or if the public spending is crowding out or in private spend.
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rises in nominal sales by all ﬁrms. But if the statistical agency does not quality-adjust prices, then the real
sales rise is understated. If the ﬁrm concerned is a monopolist over the technology and can change its prices,
then even a non-quality adjusting price index will change. So the extent to which a quality increase raises
measured productivity depends on an interaction of market structure and statistics agency convention.
Finally, there are some econometric issues. First, variation in NPUB is by time. If we include time
dummies in the regression, we can still estimate ρit since (N
PUB
t /Git) varies by industry and time (this raises
identiﬁcation issues which we discuss below in robustness). Second, 4lnTFP is noisy, and so here we use
(three-year) diﬀerences to reduce noise (we experimented with a number of diﬀerent diﬀerence lengths; one
year diﬀerences were very noisy, two/three and four year diﬀerences produced similar results to those reported
here).15 Third, to the extent that 4lnTFP is pro-cyclical, (NPUBt /Git) will induce a negative coeﬃcient
due to the dividing by Git, another reason to lag this term. Fourth, theory suggests the appropriate regressor
is real public R&D spend over real gross output. The latter is constructed from the data, but the former
begs the question of what R&D deﬂator to use; for the moment, we just use the market-sector value-added
deﬂator.
With all this in mind, our estimating equation can be written, where 43 refers to a three-year diﬀerence
∆3 lnTFP
G
it = γ1
(
∆3 lnR
PRIV
it
)
+γ2
(
Σωi,t∆3 lnR
PRIV
_i,t
)
+
[
ρ1
Xit∑
Xit
]
t−3
(
NPUBt
Git
)
t−3
+ai+at+εit (14)
5 Correlations, estimates and robustness checks
5.1 Averages
Table 3 sets out some averages. Gross output ∆3lnTFP varies across industries, being particularly fast in
business services. ∆3lnR
PRIV is high in services , reﬂecting growth from a low base, but falls in utilities,
reﬂecting falls in R&D post-privatisation. Column 3 shows outside R&D is high in services. Columns 4
and 5 show public and private R&D intensity. Variation across industries in public intensity is driven by
industry gross output (the implications of this for identiﬁcation are set out below); note that private R&D
intensity is very high in manufacturing. Finally, column 6 shows COOP. Notice that it is less skewed than
private R&D intensity; COOP is for example very high in utilities and quite high in business services.
5.2 Correlations
Figure 2 shows correlations between the variables in (14) (all in deviations from time and industry mean
terms). All correlations are positive, but industry 3 (utilities) seems somewhat of an outlier, so we checked
the data: the fall in R&D in general utilities has been documented see e.g. Oxera (2005) who argue it
is related to RPI-X regulation: Jamasb and Pollitt (2011) and Cave (2011)document the falls in R&D in
electricity and water and their eﬀects on innovation. We check our estimates for these and other potential
outliers arising from sector speciﬁc eﬀects (e.g the privatisation of Qinetiq in 2001) using robust regression
estimates, see below.
15Our main speciﬁcations uses the three-year lagged eﬀect (NPub/G)t−3.as an explanatory variable for lnTFPt − lnTFPt−3.
If we sum (NPub/G)t−3. over the three periods (t-3, t-4, t-5) we get very similar results ((NPub/G)t−3.is highly serially
correlated). Thus sum however loses us signiﬁcant degrees of freedom (our data spans 1992-2007, we rely on the input-output
tables and therefore 1992 is the furthest we can go back without interpolating across long intervals between pre-1992 IO table
releases. We start in 1995 to avoid initial year problems with capital stocks and so if we use a three year sum for a lagged
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Table 3: Averages of data (% per annum, 1995-07, all industries except agriculture)
∆3lnTFP
G ∆3lnR
PRIV
i,t ωi,t∆3lnR
PRIV
_i,t N
PUB
t /Gi,t N
PRIV
i,t /Gi,t Coopi,t
Manufacturing 0.53% 4.80% 0.31% 1.30% 2.30% 22%
Utilities 0.58% -1.80% 1.40% 11.00% 0.22% 35%
Construct 0.04% 0.60% 0.65% 4.80% 0.03% 9%
Retail, Hotel 0.77% 6.40% 0.24% 1.40% 0.20% 8%
FinSvcs 0.69% 7.70% 0.43% 4.30% 0.11% 7%
BusSvcs 0.89% 7.30% 0.45% 3.20% 0.09% 20%
Unweighted average 0.58% 4.20% 0.58% 4.30% 0.49% 17%
Notes: Final row are unweighted averages. All∆3are divided by 3 to give annual percentage point changes.
Columns are: 1=∆3lnTFP
G change in log gross output-based TFP. 2=∆3lnR
PRIV
i,t growth in private sec-
tor R&D capital, 3=
∑
ωi,t∆3lnR
PRIV
_i,t is outside industry ∆3lnR
PRIV
i,t weighted by the fraction of outside
industry workers moving to industry i over the period; in other columns, NPUB=Public R&D performed
by research councils, higher education and government labs, Git= industry gross output, N
PRIV =nominal
private R&D performed, COOP is fraction of ﬁrms in the industry co-operating with government or univer-
sities. The unweighted average ∆3lnTFP
Gfor these market sector industries in the ﬁnal row = 0.58%, the
Hulten-Domar weighted =1.44%pa.
Figure 2: Correlations with three-year growth rates of TFP
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Note to ﬁgure: all data in deviation from time and industry mean. Each point is an industry at a point for
each year 1995-2007. Each vertical axis shows ∆3 lnTFPit. The horizontal axes show, clockwise from the
top left (a) ∆3 lnR
PRIV
it , (b)
(
Σωi,t∆3 lnR
PRIV
_i,t
)
using labour force transitions across industries to measure
ωi,t,and (c) (X/ΣX)
(
NPUB/G
)
i,t−3 where the measure of X is COOP, i.e. the fraction of ﬁrms in the
industry reporting co-operation with universities or government labs.
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Table 4: Regression results of estimating (14) (dependent variable: ∆3 lnTFPit).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES R&D R&D COOP COOP COOP
∆3lnR
PRIV
i,t 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.10
(4.16) (2.72) (3.48) (6.59) (2.60)
Σω∆3lnR
PRIV
i,t 0.82 0.92 -0.68
(2.41) (1.78) (-1.73)
((R&D)/ΣR&D) ∗ (NPUB/G)i,t−3 0.41
(3.00)
((R&D)/ΣR&D) ∗ (NPUB/G)
i,t−6 0.82
(3.30)
(COOP/ΣCOOP ) ∗ (NPUB/G)i,t−3 0.36 0.21
(5.62) (4.59)
(COOP/ΣCOOP ) ∗ (NPUB/G)
i,t−6 0.20
(2.09)
F test for ﬁxed eﬀects equal (F(5,57)) 2.17 0.96
Hausman, FE versus RE (χ2(3)) 6.51 4.59
Observations 78 60 78 78 60
Number of ind 6 6 6 6 6
Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets. Sample is 1995-2007, 6 industries excluding agriculture. Estimation
by random eﬀects with time dummies. All change variables are three year diﬀerences divided by three so
that the coeﬃcients on them and the public R&D variables can be interpreted as annual elasticities and
rates of return. Memo item: average private R&D intensity=0.0049 for whole regression sample, 0.023 for
manufacturing.
5.3 Estimates
Table 4 sets out our results of estimating (14). Columns 1 and 2 use the R&D share to measureXi/ΣXiand 3,
4 and 5 use COOP. Estimation is by random eﬀects: as the test statistics show, we can drop the ﬁxed eﬀects
and the Hausman test shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁxed and random eﬀects coeﬃcients. Column
1 shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect from ∆3 lnR
PRIV
it and
(
Σωi,t∆3 lnR
PRIV
_i,t
)
, consistent
with R&D spillovers within and between industries. The coeﬃcient on (R&Di/ΣR&Di)
(
NPUB/G
)
t−3 is
likewise positive and signiﬁcant suggesting ρPUB=41%. Column 2 shows robust pattern of signiﬁcance using
the longer lagged (R&Di/ΣR&Di)
(
NPUB/G
)
t−6. Column 3, using (COOPi/ΣCOOP )
(
NPUB/G
)
t−3 is
shows a similar pattern with ρPUB = 36% ; column 4 drops the statistically insigniﬁcant
(
Σωi,t∆3 lnR
PRIV
_i,t
)
term, with ρPUB = 21%: a similar ﬁgure obtains in column 5 with a six year lag.
5.4 Robustness of ρPUB
Before exploration of the economic signiﬁcance of the results, Table 5 sets out some robustness checks,
taking as a basis table 4 , column 4, which gave ρPUB = 20%. Column 1 checks for outliers by using robust
regression techniques ρPUB is the same.
Column 2 uses a diﬀerent measure of government R&D (provided by the Department of Business, In-
novation and Skills), which is the sum of research council and HEFCE funding. So this is both a funding
variable we lose degrees of freedom).
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Table 5: Robustness tests of estimates of (14)(dependent variable: ∆3 lnTFPit).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
robust BIS SET half double no intang soft&R&D R&D in Intermed imperf comp
VARIABLES reg measure dep rate dep rate capitalised capitalised BSvcs weights nonCRS
∆lnKR&Di,t 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10
(4.74) (5.72) (6.57) (6.58) (6.06) (6.44) (6.10) (3.25)
(COOP/ΣCOOP ) ∗ (NPUB/G)i,t−3 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.16
(3.01) (4.54) (4.61) (5.02) (5.16) (3.76) (4.92) (1.87)
((COOP )/ΣCOOP ) ∗ (NPUB,SET /G)
i,t−3 0.31
(4.38)
∆lnKR&D,BSvcsi,t 0.08
(4.50)
ω∆lnKR&D
i,t 0.04
(1.13)
Σsx∆lnXi,t 0.01
(0.22)
Σs
(K,R)
x ∆lnX
(K,R)
i,t -0.05
(-1.07)
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Number of ind 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
concept, rather than performing, but also a slightly diﬀerent data source, namely BIS: the implied ρ = 0.31,
somewhat higher than 20%. Columns 3 and 4 return to the original regression, Table 4 , column 4, but halve
and double all intangible depreciation rates respectively: ρis hardly aﬀected. Columns 5 and 6 construct
4lnTFP with no intangibles capitalised and only software and R&D capitalised: ρstays the same. Column
7 leaves R&D reported as located in the business services sector in that sector as opposed to allocating to
other sectors, and Column 8 intermediate input weights for X/ΣX: again ρis not much aﬀected.
Finally, column 9 uses controls for imperfect competition and non-constant returns to scale (see Haskel
et al. (2012) and Appendix 1). The point estimate of ρPUB falls somewhat, but the additional terms are
statistically insigniﬁcant.
5.5 Discussion
First, to get some sense of the economic magnitude of these results, we may use them to ﬁnd out the
contributions of 4lnRPUBand NPUBto 4lnTFP which using (14) are
= ΣDHit
(
γ̂1
(
∆3 lnR
PRIV
it
)
+ γ̂2
(
Σωi,t∆3 lnR
PRIV
_i,t
))
+ΣDHit
(
ρ̂1
[
Xit∑
Xit
]
t−3
(
NPUB
Yi
)
t−3
)
(15)
where in the top line, the impact of 4lnRPRIV is the impact of within-industry spillovers and the between
industry spillovers, all then weighted and summed by DH). The impact ofNPUB is via ρ1, again DH weighted.
Using the coeﬃcients in column 1 and column 3 of Table 4 we obtain contributions of 4lnRPRIV and NPUB
to 4lnTFP of 1.83%pa and 0.29%pa using R&D interacted NPUB with as in column 1 and 1.13%pa and
0.19%pa using COOP interacted NPUB with as in column 3. The COOP terms are less because there is no
outside R&D growth term and ρ1is smaller. The numbers using the R&D interactions seem quite high,
suggesting we might favour the COOP results. That said, note that the UK science base is generally viewed
as being very good and most of the period is one of very low spending so one might expect high marginal
returns.
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Table 6: Policy experiments (pppa changes in 4lnTFPdue to row policy change)
R&D spec COOP spec R&D, German weights
Memo: Baseline DlnTFP 1.46% 1.46% 1.51%
Pppa deviation from baseline:
Raise NPUB by 10% 0.03 0.02 0.04
Raise ∆lnRPRIVMfring by 1pppa (4.4%pa to 5.4%pa) 0.09 0.06 0.12
Raise all ∆lnRPRIVi,t by 1pppa (econ average from 3%pa to 4%pa) 0.35 0.20 0.34
Raise all ∆lnRPRIVi,t by 1pppa (econ average from 3%pa to 5%pa) 0.70 0.37 0.68
Raise all ∆lnTFP retail by 0.1pppa (0.89%pa to 0.99%pa) 0.07 0.07 0.06
Second, our industries are quite aggregated. Many papers on spillovers use, for example, just data on
manufacturing, whereas we have manufacturing as a whole. Thus our γ1coeﬃcient, which we describe as an
inside industry eﬀect is an outside eﬀect relative to some other studies.
Third, on the public sector returns estimate, most of the variation in (XK/ΣX)∗(NPUBt /Git) is between-
industry variation. Thus the margin that identiﬁesρ is mostly driven by changes in the spread of G between
industries, or the share of R&D or co-operation. This might be misleading if such variation has a diﬀerent
return to time series variation in NPUB . To look at this, we ran a simple time series regression using the
average data from Figure 1, which just uses therefore time series variation: the coeﬃcient was much higher,
1.2 (t=2.05) so these estimates might be an understatement.
6 Policy counterfactuals
Finally, Table 6 sets out some policy experiments. The ﬁrst two columns use UK data and coeﬃcients based
on Table 4 , column 1 and column 4. The ﬁnal column uses coeﬃcients from Table 4 , column 1, but German
DH weights. As a memo item, Domar-Hulten weighted 4lnTFP is 1.46%pa but 1.51%pa with German DH
weights.
The ﬁrst row, ﬁrst and second column, shows the eﬀect of raising public R&D (here, that is spending on
research councils and HEFCE) by 10%. As the table shows, this raises 4lnTFP by 0.03pppa and 0.02pppa
reﬂecting diﬀerent returns to public R&D. The ﬁnal column shows a higher rise with German DH weights.
The second row raises growth in manufacturing R&D (4lnRPRIV,Mfring) by 1pppa, from 4.4%pa to 5.4%pa.
This raises 4lnTFP by 0.09pppa and 0.06pppa, but 0.12pppa in Germany. Rows three and four raise all
industry 4lnRPRIV by 1pppa and 2pppa respectively, raising economy-wide 4lnTFP by 0.22pppa and
0.45pppa for the co-op case, and 0.34pppa and 0.68pppa with German weights. Finally, to get some sense of
the comparative numbers row six raises 4lnTFP in retailing by 0.1pppa which is an estimate of the loss in
4lnTFP in retailing due to planning restrictions (Haskel and Sadun, 2012): this raises overall 4lnTFP by
0.07pppa (but by less with German HD weights, reﬂecting UK industrial structure being tilted to retailing).
What do we learn from this exercise? First, the returns to each reform depend upon the structure of
the economy. So, for example, if the UK economy was more high value manufacturing orientated, as is
the German economy, the marginal impact of public R&D would be higher. Second, the most substantial
productivity gains are to be seen with4lnRPRIV in all industries is raised to 5%pa. An industry R&D/GDP
ratio of 5%pa has not been seen in the UK since the 1950s and so this would be a remarkable turnaround.
Third, one might of course argue that these policies are interdependent: if for example 4lnRPUB crowded
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in 4lnRPRIV , the public sector eﬀects would be enhanced.
Finally, recall that the eﬀect of NPUBwas mediated by industry R&D spend. Thus the marginal impact
of NPUBrises with more industry R&D spend, although the eﬀect is not quite so straightforward since in our
speciﬁcation it depends upon R&D spend relative to the average: this stays the same if all industries raised
their spend by, say 7%. We examined the change in the impact of a 10% rise in NPUB ,as set out in Table
(6), row 1, if there was a rise in manufacturing R&D spend by 7%; the impact of NPUB is larger, but to the
fourth decimal place (the manufacturing R&D share rises only a very small amount from 0.886 to 0.879).
7 Conclusion
We have tried to estimate the contribution of public and private R&D to UK productivity growth on a new
set of industry data, 1992-2007. Private R&D aﬀects productivity growth are (1) R&D input, valued at
competitive factor shares and (2) (Domar-Hulten weighted) industry TFP growth if there are spillover either
within or between industries. Public sector R&D aﬀects productivity growth via spillovers to the private
sector. Thus overall eﬀects depends upon factor shares, spillovers and industrial structure. We check our
results therefore for robustness to a host of measurement and modelling assumptions e.g. allocation of R&D,
choice of interindustry spillover weights and imperfect competition.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. First, we ﬁnd evidence of spillovers of private R&D and public R&D, with
an estimated rate of return to public R&D of 20%. Second, our data are consistent with the idea that the
public R&D spillover to an industry depends on the absorptive capacity of the industry (its R&D spend or
involvement with the public sector). Third, our counter-factual policy experiments suggest a 10% rise in
public R&D would raise private TFP growth by 0.03pppa (relative to a baseline of TFP growth at 1.46%pa).
This would be 0.04pppa if the UK had Germany's industrial structure.
As mentioned, we regard these ﬁndings as complementary to others, for example, those documenting the
precise routes by which public R&D knowledge spreads. Better data over a longer period would help relate
these ﬁndings to others and test for robustness. Finally, our policy simulations are illustrative of various
changes. To study the relative impacts of, say R&D tax incentives and public support for universities, we
would have to estimate a demand for private R&D equation, simulate the dynamic eﬀects of changes in R&D
spend on the R&D stock and thence on TFP growth and compare with the public spend impact. We hope
to pursue this in future work.
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A Appendix: Imperfect competition
A.1 Assumptions and deﬁnitions
Following Haskel et al. (2012), based in turn on Basu and Fernald (2001) we may control for imperfect
competition and non-constant returns as follows. Write (1) as
∆lnGit = ∆lnAit + εMit∆lnMit + εLit∆lnLit + εKit∆lnKit + εRit∆lnRit (A.1)
where ε is an output elasticity
εXit ≡ ∂Fit
∂Xit
Xit
Fit
, Xit = Mit, Lit,Kit, Rit (A.2)
Proﬁt maximising implies
εXit ≡ µsX,it (A.3)
sX,it ≡
(
PXitXit
PGitG
)
, X = Lit,Mit,Kit, Rit
where µis a product mark-up over costs. Note that µ is not input speciﬁc, since it refers to a product market
mark-up (implicity assuming ﬁrms have no input market monoposony power). Returns to scale,φ are related
to the output elasticities (Basu and Fernald (2001)) by
.
φ ≡
∑
X=Mit,Kit,Lit,Rit
εX,it (A.4)
Finally, as above, deﬁne
∆ lnTFPit ≡ ∆ lnGit −
∑
X=Lit,Mit,Kit,Rit
sX,it∆ lnXit (A.5)
leaving aside issues around Tornquist shares etc.
A.2 Implications
This completes the model. The implications are as follows. First, note the relation between φ, returns to
scale, and µ from combining (A.3) and (A.4) is
φ ≡ µ
 ∑
X=Mit,Kit,Lit,Rit
sX,it
 (A.6)
As Basu and Fernald (2001) point out, mark-ups (µ>1) require increasing returns (φ>1) as e.g. in Cham-
berlinian/Robinson monopolistic competition. Second, suppose we have independent measures of all factor
prices, PXit (and of quantities Xit). Then we can write (A.1) as
∆lnGit = ∆lnAit + µ
∑
X=M,L.K,R
sX,it∆lnXit (A.7)
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and thus a regression of (changes in log) outputs on summed inputs will, with assumptions on A, return an
estimate of µ. This is essentially the method in Basu and Fernald (2001)), which, using (A.6) also estimates
φ. Third, suppose we do not have independent measures of PKit and PRit but we are willing to assume
constant returns, φ = 1. Then we can use (A.6) to write (A.1), using also (A.5) as
∆lnTFPit = ∆lnAit + (µ− 1)
(∑
X=M,K,R
sX,it∆ln(X/L)it
)
(A.8)
which is more or less the method of Hall (1988) to estimate µ (he omits M and R). Finally, if we neither
assume µ = 1nor φ = 1 we have
∆lnTFPit = ∆lnAit + (µ− 1)
(∑
X=M,L,K,R
sX,it∆ln(X)it
)
(A.9)
+ (φ− µ)
(∑
X=K,R
(sXK,R∆lnXit)
)
where in the last equation sXK,R = PXX/(PKK + PRR) i.e. the shares of the two capital categories whose
factor shares are derived residually: the ﬁnal terms in (A.9) disappear if µ = φ = 1. These ﬁnal terms are
added to the spillover terms in Table (5), column 9: the rest of the paper omits them which corresponds to
the traditional assumptions of µ = φ = 1.
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